Thursday, November 2, 2017

Embattled copyright lawyer uses DMCA to remove article about himself. Marc Randazza has Abused our Justice System OVER and OVER to remove online content that did not "flatter him", exposed him or flat out criticized him.

"Marc Randazza tells Wordpress that the unflattering story "is not fair use.

Well-known copyright lawyer Marc Randazza used the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) to delete an online article about a dispute between his former employer and himself.

Click Below to Read the FULL document, So many Lies. Marc Randazza is the world's most hypocritical lawyer and violates First Amendment Rights in mass. 
https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/02/embattled-copyright-lawyer-uses-dmca-to-remove-article-about-himself/

When I First Spoke to Marc Randazza he said that the Big Media had a Monopoly on Free Speech and there was Not Much I Could Do about it. Guess I Proved First Amendment Attorney Marc Randazza VERY Wrong.


Investigative Blogger Crystal Cox was the FIRST to gain Equal Free Speech Rights for ALL Bloggers to that of Institutional Press Journalists.

It was ruled for the first time that a blogger is entitled to the same free speech protection as a journalist.
On 2014, blogger Crystal Cox accused Obsidian and Kevin D. Padrick of corrupt and fraudulent conduct. Although the court dismissed most of Cox's blog posts as opinion, it found one post to be more factual in its assertions (and, therefore, defamatory).
It was ruled for the first time,[17][18] by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,[19] that a blogger is entitled to the same free speech protection as a journalist and cannot be liable for defamation unless the blogger acted negligently.[20] In the decision, journalists and bloggers are equally protected under the First Amendment[17] because the "protections of the First Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went beyond just assembling others' writings, or tried to get both sides of a story."[19]:11–12[21]


I, Crystal Cox was the FIRST, because I refused Settlements over and over. I wanted a precedent to FREE all Citizen Journalists, Investigative Bloggers and Whistleblowers

#DefamationCase #FreeSpeech #ConstitutionalLaw #CrystalCoxCase #Whistleblower #InvestigativeBlogger #Ant-Slapp #CitizenJournalist #FirstAmendment #Defamation #DefamationLawsuit 

When I First Spoke to Marc Randazza he said that the Big Media had a Monopoly on Free Speech and there was Not Much I Could Do about it. Guess I Proved First Amendment Attorney Marc Randazza VERY Wrong.

Sunday, October 29, 2017

In Randazza v. Cox, Nevada Judge Gloria Navarro issued an unconstitutional TRO against Blogger Crystal Cox and Gave Marc Randazza massive online content and intellectual property. Thereby shutting down Cox's speech and flat out stealing blogs, online content and redirecting MY WORK and PROPERTY to Randazza's Legal Blog SLAMMING me and Promoting him and his law firm. In that Case it was OK and seemingly Lawful for a Federal Judge to go ahead and take my Constitutional Rights. Check Out this case below where WORLDS Most Hypocritical Lawyer Marc Randazza Makes the OPPOSITE CASE AGAIN.

"In the motion to dissolve the order, attorney Marc Randazza points out that fashioning a libel lawsuit as a tortious interference lawsuit doesn't change the ultimate goal of the litigation: to silence criticism."


"Judge Decides Free Speech Is Still A Right; 
Dumps Prior Restraint Order Against Mattress Review Site

A couple of weeks ago, a federal judge in Utah decided prior restraint was the best way to handle a recently-filed defamation suit against Honest Mattress Reviews by Purple Innovations, makers of the Purple Mattress.
Purple's lengthy filing contained numerous allegations of harm caused by Honest Mattress Reviews' extended commentary on the white plastic powder covering every mattress Purple ships. It also alleged HMR was just a front for site owner Ryan Monahan's brand management work with Purple's competitor, Ghostbed. Rather than give HMR a chance to respond, the judge decided the review site could publish nothing further about Purple or the lawsuit. It wasn't even allowed to refer to its previous rating of Purple's mattress.
Honest Mattress Review didn't care much for this decision -- one it had been given no chance to contest. It immediately posted an article about the case and offered to comply with the letter of the order, but perhaps not its spirit.
This temporary order commands that we take down all reviews, and even cease rating this company with a rating of “Poor.” Yes, indeed, we are no longer even permitted to rate this company as Poor. I guess we will change its rating to “💩.”
[...]
Do you trust a company that, rather than compete in the marketplace, decides that it will just try and sue negative reviews out of existence?
Purple Innovations immediately returned to court, demanding it find HMR in contempt of its order, in particular pointing to the poo emoji and HMR's claims about the unconstitutionality of the order and Purple's alleged disingenuousness in filing the libel suit.
That review has since been reinstated and given this header image.
And HMR has published a long list of court documents it has filed in this case. This includes a motion to dissolve the restraining order and a preliminary examination of the powdery substance Purple claims is harmless and that HMR claims could be hazardous to purchasers' health.
The action is a quintessential SLAPP suit designed to suppress negative consumer journalism. Plaintiffs have cleverly attempted to disguise this defamation claim as a Lanham Act claim – presumably to ensure the availability of Federal Court jurisdiction and to try to side-step the clear case law that cuts against them in defamation actions. But, no matter how eloquently someone may call a “dog” a “chicken,” it will never lay eggs. And styling a specious defamation claim as a Lanham Act claim does not remove the underlying speech from the protections afforded by the First Amendment.
He also points out that Purple's claims that the plastic packing dust is harmless haven't been supported by anything Purple's willing to let customers and competitors view. Instead, it's only made vague assertions about its safety. And those statements are ultimately meaningless when examined closely.
Plaintiff sells mattresses that are made of a rubber honeycomb, which they then dust with a powder that they claim is made of plastic and has been shown to be polyethylene microspheres. In other words, someone who sleeps on these mattresses would be expected to inhale these microspheres. The Plaintiff claims that it is “non toxic” and “food grade” plastic – but this does not assuage the concerns. After all, a plastic fork is “food grade” and “non toxic” but you most certainly would not want to actually eat it. The same goes for what a person wants to put in their lungs. It was reasonable to be concerned about this “plastic powder” since (a) if the particles that make up this plastic “powder” are of a certain size, they will pass through the alveoli into the bloodstream; or (b) if they are a bit larger, they will simply lodge themselves inside the lungs.
To support its claims, HMR put a Harvard Professor of Pathology to work. Dr. John Godleski's report[PDF] is far from complete at this point, but what's contained in his preliminary examination of the powder doesn't appear to agree with Purple's assertions of harmlessness.
By Fourier Transformed Infrared spectroscopy (FTIR), the white powder particles were shown to be polyethylene, and the purple frame was found to be polyethylene-polypropylene copolymer. The foam portion of the mattress is still understudy, but has characteristics of butadiene, and may be a form of butadiene polymer.
Polyethylene is a common plastic formed into many structures. As inhalable microspheres, these have the potential to cause respiratory irritation especially when inhaled in large numbers as shown in my laboratory (1- 4). In addition, polyethylene has been associated with allergy in the form of either asthma or contact dermatitis in sensitized individuals (5-7). Based on this assessment, it is important for consumers to be aware of the composition of this fine particulate matter in the mattress which may be released into the air and has the potential for the development of respiratory or dermal hypersensitivity in some individuals.
Also included in the filed documents is an affidavit that undercuts Purple's claims about HMR's site owner being a competitor's "brand manager." This is central to Purple's Lanham Act claims -- the claims it's using to sidestep anti-SLAPP motions. The affidavit from the competitor (Ghostbed) notes HMR's site owner has never been directly employed by Ghostbed and that Ghostbed told him to stop referring to himself as its "brand manager" after noticing that statement on his Twitter profile.
The judge presiding over the case appears to have been overwhelmed by the pile of documents landing on his desk. A short order [PDF] issued on the 15th shows what can happen when a normally adversarial process is allowed to be, you know, adversarial.
For the reasons set forth in the parties’ briefing and at oral argument, the court finds a lack of “clear and unequivocal” support for a right to relief that is necessary for the entry of the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction. Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003). As such, the court hereby grants Defendants’ motions to dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 36), and denies Plaintiff’s oral Motion to convert the Temporary Restraining Order into a Preliminary Injunction. The court similarly denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Conduct Expedited Discovery (Dkt. No. 39) and Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. No. 17). The court further denies Defendants’ request for sanctions, finding that such sanctions are not warranted here.
The restraining order is lifted and HMR's turd-laced post isn't in danger of being found contemptuous. The lawsuit should continue in a more constitutional fashion from this point forward.

Source

"Conclusion and Relief Sought
Because Defendants are likely to succeed on a motion to vacate the TRO, before this Court or on appeal, a stay of the TRO is warranted. Defendants’ fundamental First Amendment rights must not be stymied by the speculations of a Plaintiff who wishes to shut down discussion rather than answer legitimate questions, no matter how hyperbolically raised. Plaintiff has no likelihood of success on its underlying claims and was not entitled to the TRO.

Case 2:17-cv-00138-DB Document 28 Filed 03/09/17 Page 23 of 25
- 24 -
The exigency and urgency of dissolving this temporary restraining order can not be
overstated. Even a temporary suppression of First Amendment rights is itself irreparable harm.
However, given that this is information consumers need to make an informed decision about the health risks inherent in use of the Purple Mattress, even a temporary suppression of this information could be the proximate cause of actual illness or injury."

" Plaintiff is clearly aggressively intent on suppressing this information. At this point, the reporting has been shored up by the expert report of Dr. Godleski. The Purple Mattress, as currently manufactured, appears to be a public health hazard. This Court should abide no further censorship. "

Source of Above and Full Hypocritical Filing

Judge Grants Randazza's Order. To bad I did not have this judge when Randazza got a TRO against me in Randazza v. Cox

"Before the court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Order to Show Cause Why Defendants Should
not be Held in Contempt (Dkt. No. 17), Defendants Ryan Monahan and Honest Reviews, LLC’s
Emergency Motion to Stay and Dissolve Temporary Restraining Order (Amended) (Dkt. No. 28), Defendant Ghostbed Inc.’s Motion to Dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 36),

"For the reasons set forth in the parties’ briefing and at oral argument, the court finds a
lack of “clear and unequivocal” support for a right to relief that is necessary for the entry of the “extraordinary remedy” of a preliminary injunction. Greater Yellowstone Coal v. Flowers, 321 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2003). As such, the court hereby grants Defendants’ motions to dissolve the Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 36), and denies Plaintiff’s oral Motion to convert the Temporary Restraining Order into a Preliminary Injunction. "

"For the foregoing reasons, and for those expressed in the parties’ briefing and oral
arguments, Docket Numbers 17 and 39, as well as Plaintiff’s oral Motion to convert the
Temporary Restraining Order into a Preliminary Injunction, are hereby DENIED. Docket
Number 28 and the portion of Docket Number 36 requesting dissolution of the Temporary
Restraining Order are GRANTED. Defendants’ request for sanctions is DENIED."

Source of Above and Full Judicial Order

Check out Randazza v. Cox Docket and See how to REALLY use prior restraint to suppress speech and flat out steal online content AND top search engine placement. 

Lot's More Coming SOON on how to us a TRO effectively to Steal Content, Steal Search Engine Placement, Steal Intellectual Property and More. As inspired by Randazza Legal Group, Marc Randazza, J. DeVoy and Ronald Green. 

Questions or Tips??? eMail me at ReverendCrystalCox@Gmail.com

#MarcRandazza #RandazzaQuotes #RandazzaLegalGroup #FreeSpeech 

Wednesday, October 25, 2017

Marc Randazza Bankruptcy Challenges by Liberty Media

Marc Randazza Bankruptcy and Liberty Media

"In the meantime, Randazza's old employer, Liberty Media, is challenging his Nevada court filing seeking Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. In that filing, Randazza claimed assets of up to $10 million, and liabilities of up to $50 million. Randazza included in his liabilities a potential $10 million judgement against him in a lawsuit with a blogger, Crystal Cox of Washington; $1 million to Liberty; as well as another $1 million judgement against him in a lawsuit he's embroiled in with Roca Labs of Largo, Florida."

Source and More
http://1701news.com/node/1183/so-who-klingon-lawyer-marc-randazza.html

Liberty Media Opposition Motion (Doc. 38)
"In an effort to avoid payment of the entire monetary component of the IAA, and before the
IAA could be confirmed by the state court, Debtor, by and through its counsel L&Z, initiated
settlement negotiations with E/L. During these negotiations, Debtor consistently used the threat of
a bankruptcy petition in an attempt to negotiate a sum of payment significantly reduced from that
awarded to E/L in the IAA. Not only did Debtor use the threat of bankruptcy as a cudgel, but he andhis allegedly estranged wife have initiated sealed divorce proceedings, and dissipated assets."

"Debtor attempted delay for two reasons: (1) in a misguided effort to stay the award of attorneys fees by the Arbitrator, as well as the confirmation of the IAA by the state court; and (2) to push the date of petition out more than 90 days, so that Debtor’s fraudulent, improper, and preferential transfers could not be clawed back, including payments to his attorneys L&Z.

According to Debtor’s schedules filed on September 11, 2015, Debtor has deposited with
L&Z sums totaling $94,000. [ECF 15] On September 22, 2015, L&Z filed the instant Application
to Employ and Retain Larson & Zirzow, LLC as Attorneys for the Debtor Nunc Pro Tunc to the
Petition Date."

"According to the retainer agreements and statements made therein, L&Z entered into
representation of Debtor as of June 11, 2015 for “pre-bankruptcy settlement negotiations and to
attend a settlement conference. The Debtor paid L&Z a flat fee of $10,000.00 for this engagement.”

"L&Z also purports to have been retained, via two separate retainer agreements, for representation in both a bankruptcy action, and a potential adversary proceeding."

"the second was for potential nondischargeability litigation. "

"L&Z’s Application is deficient as it relates to exactly what the scope of services are that it
has billed for as of yet. In fact, L&Z only informs as to the fact that it has received a total sum of
$94,000 for legal services in connection with Debtor’s Chapter 11 case. “Of this sum, L&Z billed
and was paid the sum of $26,908.82 prior to the Petition Date, and L&Z currently holds in trust the
remainder sum of $67,091.18 (the “Remaining Retainer”) a portion of which has been allocated
pursuant to the Representation Agreements for potential adversary proceedings.” [ECF 18 at ¶16 (emphasis added)] This Application utterly fails to identify and delineate what services were
provided totaling $26,908.82."

"In any event, all transfers were made within 90 days of the filing of Debtor’s Petition. As
such, the “pre-bankruptcy” retainer fees charged and collected by L&Z constitute an avoidable
preferential transfer, and the funds must be clawed back to the estate. As a result, L&Z will lose
their status as “disinterested parties” and are therefore not qualified to serve as attorneys for the
Debtor.

II. L&Z’S APPLICATION IS INSUFFICIENT TO SATISFY THE TEST FOR
APPROVAL OF HIRING OF PROFESSIONALS.

L&Z’s employment as attorneys for the debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case is
governed by § 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which requires court approval for the attorney's
employment. The bankruptcy court is charged with “ensur[ing] that attorneys who represent the
debtor do so in the best interests of the bankruptcy estate.” In re Park–Helena Corp., 63 F.3d 877,
880 (9th Cir.1995). Under § 327, an attorney for a debtor cannot “hold or represent an interest
adverse to the estate”; he or she must be a “disinterested person.” 11 U.S.C. § 327(a).

Any creditor of the estate, or anyone with “an interest materially adverse to the interest of the estate ... by reason  of any direct or indirect relationship to, connection with, or interest in, the debtor,” is not a disinterested person. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(14)(A), (C). A “creditor” includes any “entity that has a
claim against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the
debtor.” § 101(10)(A). A “claim” includes any “right to payment.” § 101(5)(A).
To enable the Bankruptcy Court to evaluate an attorney's potential employment, Rule
2014(a) requires that an application for employment of an attorney under § 327 “shall be
accompanied by a verified statement of the person to be employed setting forth the person's
connections with the debtor, creditors, any other party in interest, their respective attorneys and
accountants, the United States trustee, or any person employed in the office of the United States
trustee.” Fed. R. Bankr.P. 2014(a). This disclosure requirement is applied “strictly.” Park–Helena,
63 F.3d at 881.

An attorney approved for employment under § 327 must apply for interim or final
compensation, which is subject to approval of the Bankruptcy Court. 11 U.S.C. §§ 328–31; see also
In re Chapel Gate Apartments, Ltd., 64 B.R. 569, 575 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.1986) (noting that “fees in
bankruptcy cases ... are subject to review, modification, and outright cancellation by the Court”).
Rule 2016(a) requires an attorney seeking compensation and/or reimbursement of expenses to file
an application “setting forth a detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and
expenses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested.”

The fee application must also include, inter alia, “a statement as to what payments have theretofore been made or promised to the applicant for services rendered or to be rendered in any capacity whatsoever in connection with the case, [and] the source of the compensation so paid or promised.” Id. After notice and a hearing, the court may award “reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered,” as well as “reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.” §330(a)(1)."

Source and Full Filing
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.38.0.pdf


Liberty Media Move for Order to Modify Stay
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.60.0.pdf

Doc. 60-2 to above Motion
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.60.2.pdf

Motion to Confirm Arbitration Award Exhibit - 60-6
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.60.6.pdf

Liberty Media Reply
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.80.0.pdf

COMPLAINT by Liberty Media and Others to Determine Non-Dischargeable Debt
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.83.0.pdf

Doc. 120 filed by Liberty Media, First Amended Complaint, Demand for Jury Trial
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.120.0.pdf

Marc Randazza Bankruptcy Case Docket
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.docket.html


Doc. 148 Settlement
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.148.0.pdf
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.157.0.pdf

EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR ORDER DIRECTING EXAMINATION
PURSUANT TO FED.R.BANKR.P.2004 OF MARC J. RANDAZZA
Doc. 187

"Creditors Excelsior Media Corp. (“Excelsior”) and Liberty Media Holdings, LLC
(“Liberty” and together with Excelsior, “Creditors”), by and through their counsel, James D.
Greene, Esq. of Greene Infuso, LLP pursuant to section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code and Rule
2004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and Rule 2004 of the Local Rules of
Bankruptcy Practice and Procedure, hereby apply to the Court for entry of order directing Debtor
Marc J. Randazza (“Debtor”) to appear for and submit to examination under oath before certified court reporter at the office of Greene Infuso, LLP, 3030 South Jones Blvd. Suite 101, Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 on a date and time to be determined, providing that notice of said examination is to be provided no less than 10 judicial days before such examination date. In support of this
application (“Application”), Creditors state as follows:

LEGAL ARGUMENT

An examination pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 2004 can be ordered [o]n motion of any
party in interest.” In re Stasz, 387 B.R. 271, 273 n.3 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2008); see also In re Lifeco
Inv. Grp., Inc., 173 B.R. 478, 480 (Bankr. D. Del 1994), quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2004(a).
Bankruptcy Rule 2004 further provides that the Court may order the examination and the
production of documentary evidence concerning any matter that relates “to the liabilities and
financial condition of the debtor, or to any matter which may affect the administration of the
debtor’s estate, or… any other matter relevant to the case or tot the formulation of a plan.” Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 2004(b); see also In re Dinubilo, 177 B.R. 932, 936 n.6 (E.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that
“[u]nder Rule 2004, a court may order the examination of any person on motion of any party in
interest.”). 

Generally, examinations under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 are for the “purpose of
discovering assets and unearthing frauds.” In re Rafsky, 300 B.R. 152, 153 n.2 (Bankr. D. Conn.
2003) (citation omitted); In re N. Plaza LLC, 395 B.R. 113, 122 n.9 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
The scope of a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination is “unfettered and broad,” as the plain
language of the rule indicates. See 9 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 2004.02[1] at 2004-6 (15th ed. Rev.
1997); In re Dinublilo, 177 B. R. at 939 quoting In re GHR Energy Corp., 33 B.R. 451, 453
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1983). 

The broad latitude of Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination furthers the purpose of the rule, which is “to allow the court to gain a clear picture of the condition and the whereabouts of the bankrupt’s estate. In re Int’l Fibercom, Inc., 283 B.R. 290, 292 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2002) (permitted Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination aimed at “obtaining information that will … potentially uncover additional claims that may exist for the benefit of the estate”); see also In re W & S Investments, Inc., 985 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1993) (“Bankruptcy Rule 2004 is a broadly construed discovery device…”); In re French, 145 B. R 991, 992 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1992) (“Bankruptcy Rule 2004… does not offer the procedural safeguards available under Rule 26 of the Federal Rule Rules of Civil Procedure.”)."

"The information and documents which Creditors seek through this Application relate to
matters that are clearly with the permitted scope of Rule 2004, including: (i) property of the
Debtor’s bankruptcy estate; (ii) transactions and business dealings involving the Debtor and
family members and corporate entities; (iii) potential claims the Creditor may have against third
parties; and (iv) other matters affecting the administration of the Debtor’s estate."

Source and Full Document

Above Order Granted
http://ia800807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.188.0.pdf


Doc. 191 Liberty Media SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF IN SUPPORT
OF MOTION FOR ORDER CONFIRMING INTERIMARBITRATION AWARD
http://ia600807.us.archive.org/26/items/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854/gov.uscourts.nvb.348854.191.0.pdf


CAN YOU SAY PATTERN AND HISTORY ???

Tuesday, July 14, 2015

Stephen E. Haberfield Arbitrator; Marc Randazza of Randazza Legal Group FINALLY gets EXPOSED for who he REALLY Is. Now will the Authorities STOP him from creating so many victims ? Check Out the Document Below.

"THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR --- in accordance with the
arbitration provision in Section 8 of the Contract For Employment Agreement As
General Counsel Between Marc J. Randazza and Excelsior Media Corp., dated
June 6/10,2009 ( consideration of the evidence, the parties' written submissions and applicable
law, and good cause appearing--- make the following findings, conclusions,
determinations ("determinations") and this Interim Arbitration Award, as
follows:


(employment agreement ), and based upon careful

DETERMINATIONS


1. The determinations in this Interim Arbitration Award include
factual determinations by the Arbitrator, which the Arbitrator has determined to
be true and necessary to this award. To the extent that the Arbitrator's
determinations differ from any party's positions, that is the result of
determinations as to relevance, burden of proof considerations, and the weighing
of the evidence.


2. The Arbitrator has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties to the arbitration which are as follows: Claimant and Counter-
Respondent Marc J. Randazza ("Mr. Randazza"), Respondents and
Counterclaimants Excelsior Media Corp. ("Excelsior"), Liberty Media Holdings,
LLC ("Liberty''), and Respondent Jason Gibson.


3. On February 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, 2015, the Arbitrator held in-person
evidentiary sessions on the merits of the parties' respective claims, counterclaims
and contentions. All witnesses who testified did so under oath and subject to
cross-examination. All offered exhibits were received in evidence.

4. This Interim Arbitration Award is timely rendered. See Order of June 1, 2015.

5. The following is a summary of the Arbitrator's principal merits
determinations:


Except as otherwise stated or indicated by context, "E/L" shall be used to reference
Excelsior and Liberty, collectively and interchangeably for convenience in this Interim
Arbitration Award, only. Nothing should be inferred or implied that there is any
determination, or basis for any determination, that either or both of those entities are
"alter egos" of Jason Gibson or of any person or entity. Mr. Randazza failed to sustain
his burden of proof that either Excelsior or Liberty were or are "alter egos" of
Respondent Jason Gideon or of any person or entity. Mr. Gideon will be dismissed as a
party in this arbitration. See Interim Arbitration Award, Par. 9, at p. 29, infra .


2.

A. Mr. Randazza voluntarily ended his employment by Excelsior and Liberty.

B. Mr. Randazza's employment by Excelsior and Liberty was not involuntarily terminated by Excelsior, Liberty or at alP

C.   Whether or not Mr. Randazza's employment by E/L was terminated voluntarily by Mr. Randazza or involuntarily by E/L, the principal proximate cause for the ending of Mr. Randazza's employment was Mr. Randazza's breaches of fiduciary duty and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied in his employment agreement, as an employee, executive and general counsel of E/L.

The precipitating events which led to the end of Mr. Randazza's employment was Mr. Gideon's having first learned on August 13, 2012 that Mr. Randazza had been involved in and successfully concluded negotiations for a bribe in the amount of $75,000, to be paid to Mr. Randazza by the other side in connection with resolution of high-importance litigation, commonly referred to as the "Oron litigation," which had been initiated and pursued on behalf of E/L by Mr. Randazza, as E/L's counsel of record.

The first indication of that was Mr. Gideon's noticing a provision included in an
execution copy of an Oron settlement agreement, presented to him for signature by Mr. Randazza on that date, and Mr. Gideon's inquiring of Mr. Randazza about that provision.

After initial contacts with Mr. Randazza concerning what Mr. Gideon discovered in the Oron settlement agreement, communications and relations between Messrs. Gideon and Randazza noticeably chilled during Mr. Randazza's remaining employment, which ended on August 29,2012.

2.  While not accepting Mr. Randazza's "core contentions" concerning the end of his employment by E/L, the Arbitrator agrees with Mr. Randazza's assertion that "The nature of Mr. Randazza's departure from Excelsior is cenh·al to several of his causes of action, and crucial to the defenses Respondents raise" --- including whether there was a breach of contract, wrongful termination, constructive termination and/ or retaliatory termination. Reply at p. 7:12-15. As also stated elsewhere herein, none of those claims were proven.

3.    The chilled relations, including greatly reduced communication, was in stark contrast with the custom and practice of Messrs.

Gibson and Randazza, practically right up to August 13, 2012, being in regular, frequent, cordial and occasionally sexually-peppered communication with each other by face-to-face meetings, texting and emails.

That Mr. Gideon's reaction was not feigned or a pretext for anything asserted by Mr. Randazza in his competing narrative are shown by the following:

1.   A sudden and significant reduction of those previously primarily electronic (i.e., email and text) communications --- beginning only after Mr. Gideon learned of the $75,000 bribe--- with Mr. Randazza sending Mr. Gideon unresponded-to emails attempting to attempting to salvage and revive his communications and relationship with Mr. Gideon.

2.   Mr. Randazza beat a hasty retreat, in an attempt to salvage the situation by offering to pay the bribe money over to E/L, when initially confronted by Mr. Gideon concerning the bribe provision in the Oron settlement agreement, presented for Mr. Gideon's signature.

3. Mr. Gideon did not timely sign the execution copy of the Oron settlement agreement, as negotiated and presented to him by Mr. Randazza.

D. The ending of Mr. Randazza's employment E/L was not --- as contended by Mr. Randazza --- (1) constructive discharge, proximately caused by Mr. Gibson becoming distant and out-of-communication with Mr. Randazza, which made it difficult or impossible for Mr. Randazza to get needed instructions or direction in his employment byE/Las their general counsel, leading to Mr. Randazza's employment, or (2) retaliatory termination, which was caused by Mr. Randazza
having expressed his feelings of having been upset, betrayed, offended, and  August 29, 2012 email of resignation from stressed" anything of a sexual nature whatsoever--- including, as highlighted
during hearing, a pornographic video shot in Mr. Randazza's office in April, 2012 or a homosexual oral copulation allegedly performed by Mr. Gideon and another ElL executive in the backseat of Mr. Randazza's car, which allegedly greatly upset Mr. Randazza while he was driving his passengers back from a party aboard Mr. Gideon's boat on August 9, 2012.

E. The immediately foregoing Determination's repeated use of the word "allegedly" is because it is not necessary to resolve a conflict of evidence as to whether the alleged sexual act in Mr. Randazza's car actually occurred or the degree of upset it caused Mr. Randazza, if it actually occurred. That is because the Arbitrator has determined that--- contrary to Mr. Randazza's central contentions in this arbitration--- the factual and legal cause of the end of Mr. Randazza's employment had nothing whatsoever to do with anything having to do with alleged sexual activity in Mr. Randazza's car--- alone or taken together with a pornographic shoot which, without dispute, occurred in his office,
without prior notice to Mr. Randazza, but which the evidence shows did not occur as alleged, was not strongly or even negatively reacted to by Mr. Randazza as initially alleged and did not, as shot or shown, include a photograph of Mr. Randazza's family, as initially presented by Mr. Randazza.

The foregoing determination includes that anything relating to sex ---including in connection with a filmed video in Mr. Randazza's ElL office or in the back seat of his car--- had nothing whatsoever to do with any decision --- which the Arbitrator has determined was neither made or considered --- to terminate Mr. Randazza's ElL employment. 2012.

There was no ElL contrived pretext or any retaliation by ElL in connection with the cessation of Mr. Randazza's ElL employment, which was entirely voluntary on Mr. Randazza's part.

For those reasons, the Arbitrator has determined that Mr. Randazza failed to sustain his burden of proof required to establish his claims of and relating to anything having to do with sex --- e.g., sexual harassment, hostile work environment, constructive termination, retaliatory termination, etc.

F. As stated above --- and as picked up and amplified later in the Determinations portion of this Award--- since the outset of the arbitration, Mr. Randazza made highly-charged, sexually-based "core allegations" and his claimed strong reactions to them in support of his statutory and contractual claims, which were in the main disproved or not proved. That failure of proof undermined and impaired Mr. Randazza's credibility concerning all of his testimony and his claims and related contentions.

The evidence established at hearing was that Mr. Randazza intended that his allegations would induce Mr. Gideon to authorize a settlement financially favorable to Mr. Randazza, based on Mr. Randazza's belief at the time--- and ultimately proven incorrect--- that Mr. Gideon would so settle, rather than have to litigate true or false allegations relating to his own sexuality, sexual activity, and the pornographic nature of E/L's business.

Mr. Randazza's miscalculation, as aforesaid, led to an ultimately successful counterattack by E/L, via counterclaims in this arbitration, centering on ethical and legal challenges to Mr. Randazza general counsel and litigation counsel during his employment by E/L.

Mr. Randazza negotiations with adverse parties, including concerning monetary bribes to conflict (Mr. Randazza) out from future litigation, further damaging E/L recovery in the Oron litigation by knowingly forwarding illegally computer data to counsel for another company, without authorization and in contravention of an E/L settlement agreement, engaging in other prohibited conflicts of interest, including representing competitors of E/L, not disclosing and not obtaining informed written client consents from E/L where actual or potential conflicts of interest arose, working and not disclosing that he was working as a practicing lawyer on non-E/L matters during his employment significantly in excess of what was contractually permitted, spoliation of evidence to cover up the foregoing and his undisclosed intention to resign from  employment, including via planning and causing the deletion of legal files and other relevant data from E/L-owned computers, taking control of client funds, in form of Oron litigation settlement proceeds, and refusing to unconditionally release the same to E/L.

G. As stated above, Mr. Randazza voluntarily ended his employment by E/L. The principal evidence of that consisted of (1) Mr. Randazza 2012 email to Mr. Gideon, (2) days before sending Mr. Gideon his August 29 email, Mr. Randazza cleaned out his personal belongings from his office, (3)
shortly after Noon on August 28--- and more than 24 hours before sending his August 29 email to Mr. Gideon--- Mr. Randazza had his corporate laptop computer Wiped the first of four times during his last week of employment, and (4) before that, Mr. Randazza was overheard to say Fuck this shit, I quit/ following a company happy hour event.


H.   In his August 29,2012 email to Mr. Gideon, Mr. Randazza stated
that he could no longer represent the Company, i.e., E/L. s In the circumstances
then known, Mr. Gideon and other E/L executives with whom he consulted
reasonably, and not hastily, concluded from their review of Mr. Randazza's
August 29, 2012 email that Mr. Randazza had resigned from his employment.

Their conclusion was proven accurate by facts which became known after Mr.
Randazza's departure. Any actions taken by them based on that reasonable
belief did not result in any involuntary termination of Mr. Randazza's E/L
employment.

I.    The lack of absolute, unquestionable, pristine clarity in Mr.
Randazza's August 29, 2012 carefully worded and crafted email that he was
resigning his employment was deliberate.

J.   In addition to Mr. Randazza's disputed, disproved and unproved
allegations of sexual conduct engaged in or authorized by is important evidence
which established that Mr. Randazza was not either (1) a target of any
discriminatory or conduct which created a hostile work environment, because of
his being a heterosexual or "straight" male, or (2) offended by any of the sexually-
related conduct of which he has complained.

K.   Prior to and subsequent to agreeing to go "in house" as E/L's
general counsel, Mr. Randazza was outside counsel to several companies
engaged in Internet pornography, including videos and stills available on openly
homosexual websites. Since at least the date of the commencement of his
employment as E/L's inside general counsel through his last day of E/L
employment, Mr. Randazza knew of and was not in any way uncomfortable with
Mr. Gideon's gay sexual orientation--- which was also that of most, but not all,
of E/L's other executives --- and the frequent seasoning of business and socially-
related conversation and written communications with crude gay and other
sexual terms, references and allusions, which Mr. Randazza also used.

Mr. Randazza was not embarrassed to be seen or filmed in full undress at a poolside business-social event at Mr. Gideon's home. Mr. Randazza permitted and encouraged his children to have warm personal relationships with Mr. Gideon, who they called "Uncle."

L. The evidence was that the only complaints which Mr. Randazza had concerning the pornographic filming in his offices in April2012 --- four months before the end of his employment--- were that (1) he was not given the courtesy of advance notice of the shoot and (2) after the shoot was completed,
Mr. Randazza's office was not restored to just the way it had been before the office was prepped for filming.

The preponderance of disputed evidence was not that Mr.  Randazza complained to Mr. Gideon centering on or in any way reasonably relating to sexual discrimination or harassment or a hostile work environment based on sex, including "male-on-male" sex, which has been recognized as a basis
for a legal claim. Accordingly, allegedly involuntary termination of Mr. Randazza's employment, based on Mr. Randazza's April2012 complaint about the filming of pornography in his office --- which did not constitute statutorily "protected activity" ---is not includible as a component for a statutory claim that he had been fired in retaliation for making that complaint. Mr. Randazza's
complaint about the allegedly personally offensive oral copulation of Mr. Gideon in the back seat of his car on August 9, 2012 was not genuinely or deeply felt and was made primarily for tactical reasons. Therefore, the end of Mr. Randazza's employment was not and was not the product of anything retaliatory, in violation of public policy (e.g., engaging in protected activity), as a matter of law.

Moreover, the preponderance of the evidence is that Mr. Randazza had advance notice of the filming of a pornographic video in his office and that he did not either object or indicate that the noticed shoot was in any way objectionable or offensive to him. That evidence is the playful exchange of texts between Messrs. Randazza and Gideon concerning the intended shoot and the testimony of the director of the shoot, Chaz Vorrias, who testified that he advised Mr. Randazza of the shoot in advance and received no objection from Mr. Randazza.

M.   Contrary to the strong impression created by Mr. Randazza's pre-Arbitration Hearing narrative of allegations, there was no evidence that any photograph(s) of his wife or children or anything personal of or concerning Mr. Randazza or any member of his family, or in any way reasonably violative of
their respective personal privacy, were used or visible in the video. The (possible) visibility of a painting on the wall of Mr. Randazza's office, which was painted by Mr. Randazza's wife, is not to the contrary.

In the circumstances, there was no action taken which was either statutorily offensive or hostile.

N.  Mr. Randazza's California Labor Code-based claims--- for
Excelsior's failure to (1) pay him his final wages in August 2012 (2nd Claim) or
(2) reimburse and indemnify his for business expenses incurred by him in during
2012 (1st Claim)--- fail as a matter of law. The same is true for Mr. Randazza's
claim for payment of all of his wage-related claims --- including payment of
raises, bonuses and repayment of his $25,000 loan.

That is because--- at all times relevant to those California Labor Code claims, since June 2011, Mr. Randazza worked and lived in Nevada, to which Mr. Randazza relocated, as did E/L, in order to continue as E/L's general counsel. As stated or indicated in a pretrial ruling bearing on the same issue,

(1) the California Labor Code, presumptively, does not apply extraterritorially, and does not apply to the facts and circumstances of this case, and relatedly,

(2) that determination, concerning Mr. Randazza's non-contractual claims, is unaffected by the California-as-governing- substantive-law provision of Mr. Randazza's employment agreement with
Excelsior, which applies and controls only as to breach-of-contract claims and
not, as in this instance, Mr. Randazza's statutory claims.

In the event, Mr. Randazza was properly compensated for all
services as to which he has asserted statutory and contractual claims.

Mr. Randazza's claim for unpaid wages and penalties under
Nevada NRS Sec.608.050 (3rd Claim) fails as a matter of law, because there is no
private right of action for enforcement of that statute. It is therefore not
necessary to decide whether the a claim has been stated under that statute.

P.   As to Mr. Randazza's contractual claims--- which are governed by
the Employment Agreement, including the provision that California law governs
its interpretation and enforcement, etc.---

(1) Mr. Randazza is not entitled to a contractual severance payment, because he voluntarily resigned his employment,

(2) Mr. Randazza is not entitled to any payment for expenses in connection with the annual International Trademark Association Conference, which he did not attend, and

(3) Mr. Randazza's bonuses were to be paid on "net" amount, not "gross" amounts, as contended by Mr. Randazza. In the event, E/ L has been legally excused from any obligation to make any further contractual payment, by reason of Mr. Randazza's material breaches of contract with respect
to the his obligations under the same contract, Mr. Randazza's employment agreement. That is so under contract law principles--- separate and apart from equitable principles, which are also applicable to contract claims, including the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, which is applicable to Mr. Randazza's contract claims.

Q. Turning to E/L's counterclaims, Mr. Randazza owed fiduciary
duties to E/ L, because he was their in-house general counsel and their attorney
of record in judicial civil actions, and an E/L executive and employee.

As such, Mr. Randazza owed E/ L, as his clients, employers and principals, the highest
duty of loyalty and honesty in the performance of his professional and executive
obligations. That duty--- among other things--- included legal and ethical
duties of acting honestly and solely for the benefit of his clients/ employers/ principals, avoiding acting inconsistently with those duties, and where actual or potential conflicts of interests existed to make full written disclosure of the same and to obtain informed written consents from his
clients/ principals as to each and every such conflict of interest.

Each and all of Mr. Randazza's ethical duties owed to his principals/ clients was a legal fiduciary
duty owed to them. Mr. Randazza violated those fiduciary duties owed by him to E/L, as his principals/ clients/ employers--- including by the following:


(1) engaging in negotiations for monetary bribes to be paid to him--- including
the "Oron $75,000" which Mr. Gideon noticed, without Mr. Randazza's
affirmative disclosure of it ---- which would result in his being "conflicted out" of
future litigation or any disputes with parties then and/ or in the future with
interests adverse to E/L's interests (e.g., Oron, TNA),J3 (2) taking control for his
personal benefit of, and refusing to relinquish control over, Oron settlement
funds --- all of which ought to have been for the benefit and under the direction
and control of his principals/ clients E/L, before and after the end of his
employment and representations on behalf of E/L ---

(3) Mr. Randazza's ordering and causing the deliberate "wiping" of his and legal assistant's
corporate laptops, as an integral part of his planned resignation as E/L's General
Counsel and outside counsel of record, and

(4) Mr. Randazza's continuing and undisclosed (and thus unconsented-to) legal work for clients (e.g., Bang Bros., XVideos, XNXX, Porn Garian, Titan Media, Kink), whose interests were actually
and potentially adverse to E/L's interests.

R. The Arbitrator respectfully disagrees with Mr. Randazza's expert
witnesses, who respectively testified that, under both Nevada and California
rules of ethics and/ or professional responsibility, there were no violations of
fiduciary duty, if and because they concluded that there was no resulting harm.

The "fact of damage" or proximate cause is not an essential element of either "duty" or "breach of duty" ---but rather a separate element of a claim or cause of The Arbitrator's disagreement with Mr. Randazza's expert witnesses centers Whether or not Mr. Randazza's breaches of fiduciary duty proximately resulted in damages sustained by Excelsior, Liberty or both of them ---as a matter of sound public policy--- Mr. Randazza should not be allowed to retain any pecuniary or legal benefit resulting from or closely connected to those
breaches.

For example, Mr. Randazza has included in his defense of his
admitted deletion of files and other legal information via multiple wipings of
company-owned computers the assertion that Respondents have not been able to
show any damage resulting from those multiple wipings. This is another of Mr.
Randazza's assertions in this arbitration of "No harm, no foul"--- which the
Arbitrator has not accepted, primarily because of the violations of duties
constituting and/ or including fiduciary duties. Ethical and other violations of
fiduciary duties do not require "fact of harm" to be shown by a preponderance of
the evidence or otherwise.

Moreover, in the circumstances of (1) multiple ethical violations
having been shown to have been committed by Mr. Randazza ---including
negotiating for and in the instance of the Oron settlement agreeing to a "bribe" to
be conflicted out of future litigation with adverse settling parties and other
conflicts of interest--- and (2) Mr. Randazza's ethical challenges shown in this
arbitration, there should be a presumption of "fact of harm" caused to E/L by Mr.
Randazza's conduct and, additionally, a presumption of Mr. Randazza's
intention to harm his clients by wiping everything off of his and his legal
assistant's company-owned computers.

As E/L's inside general counsel and employee, Mr. Randazza had
a legal and fiduciary duty--- no later than when his employment ceased,
regardless of whether or not with or without cause and/ or by whom ended---
to deliver every file and other piece of data and/ or information--- complete,
intact and undeleted, unmodified and immediately accessible and usable by E/L.

That included all files and data stored on the computers entrusted to Mr.
Randazza and his legal assistant Erika Dillon for their use by and on behalf of
E/L. Because of his noncompliance, indeed resistance to compliance with those
duties, they continued and continue to the day of the rendering of this award---
including beyond Mr. Randazza's belated and resisted turnover of one of the
laptop computers--- because another laptop entrusted to Mr. Randazza remains
unreturned. Those continuing fiduciary duties owed by him to E/L exist,
including by reason of his exclusive control over the computers and thus
superior knowledge of what was on each computer's hard drive before and after
he had everything on the returned laptops completely and multiply deleted ---
including prior and in contemplation of his planned resignation on August 29,
2012.


In the circumstances, Mr. Randazza 's generalized and unspecified
claims of privacy --- in attempted justification of his ordered complete and
multiple wipings of company-owned computers --- cannot be accorded weight or
credibility. By the same token, that ordered conduct raises an inference that
whatever was deleted was known and intended by Mr. Randazza to be harmful
to him and any claims and contentions which he might make in any dispute with
E/L --- i.e., deliberate spoliation, in addition to conversion.

Mr. Randazza cannot escape liability for spoliation or conversion ---
or, additionally, violation of his fiduciary duties as an employee, executive and
general counsel of E/L, by reason of the same conduct --- by claiming, as he has,
that Respondents have not shown any specific or tangible injury by reason of his
conduct in causing company-owned computers to be completely wiped of all
data prior to their resisted and belated return.

In the circumstances--- and paraphrasing former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ---neither Respondent should bear any burden or responsibility to come forward with any evidence of
damage, when they do not know what they do not know. As stated above--- with his actual exclusive knowledge of what was on the computers' hard drives, before and because he ordered them to be completely wiped and, in the instance of his returned laptop, multiply wiped before ultimate return--- Mr. Randazza committed spoliation of evidence, as well as improper conversion of his
employer's files, data and equipment and, in so doing, also violated his fiduciary
duties owed to E/L.

S. The closure of the Nevada State Bar's file on the grievance filed by
E/L has not been given any weight in this arbitration. The reasons for that are
manifold, several of the most significant of which include the following: (1) the
State Bar did not reach the merits of E/L's grievance, (2) even if it would have,
the standard of evaluation would have been 11 clear and convincing evidence,''
rather than the standard applicable in this arbitration of 11 preponderance of the
evidence, 11 (3) Mr. Randazza's response to E/L's grievance contained at least one
material misrepresentation acknowledged during an evidentiary session in this
arbitration (that he stopped representing XVideos in 2009), (4) the Nevada State
Bar closed its file with an express statement that it has "no authority to take any
action which could affect the outcome of any civil disputes or litigation, (5) many
of the issues and much of the evidence presented in this arbitration (identities of
represented entities, retainer and billing records, emails, etc.) was not available to
be presented by E/Lin support of its grievance (e.g., Mr. Randazza's assisting
Datatech, including via forwarding fruits of a disclosed (unnamed) computer
"hacker").

T.   E/L was damaged in at least the amount of $275,000, by reason of
the Oron resettlement, as a direct and proximate result of events being set in
motion by Mr. Randazza's violations of fiduciary duty and other duties, by his
having secretly negotiated a $75,000 bribe to conflict himself out from suing Oron
in the future.

U.    Mr. Randazza was unjustly enriched in the amount of $60,000. Of
that amount, $55,000 was paid to and received by Mr. Randazza's law firm,
rather than E/L, in connection with (1) Mr. Randazza's ostensibly pro bono
representation in connection with the so-called "Righthaven cases," of which E/L
was generally aware and consented to (A) with the understanding and on the
condition that Mr. Randazza was acting as a faithful, compensated E/L
employee, including in compliance with his employment agreement, with costs
of the representation advanced by E/L, including compensation as employees of
Mr. Randazza and his legal assistant Erika Dillon, and (2) unaware that
compensation was to be or actually paid to Mr. Randazza, via his law firm, until
after the fact, indeed after Mr. Randazza's resignation from E/L employment.

Mr. Randazza also received $5,000 from James Grady, in connection with E/L's
Oron litigation. Although Mr. Randazza testified, without corroboration, that
Of the $60,000 paid and received, (A) $55,000 was court-awarded attorneys' fees,
which were paid to Mr. Randazza's law firm, and (B) $5,000 was paid by James Grady.

Mr. Grady's payment was used for Oron litigation expenses, Mr. Randazza did
not disclose the receipt of the Grady $5,000 payment to E/L. In the
circumstances, and under principles of unjust enrichment, all compensation paid
to or for the benefit of Mr. Randazza should have been paid directly toE/Lor
turned over to E/L by Mr. Randazza ---neither of which was done, immediately
or ever.

V.    Mr. Randazza materially breached his employment agreement with
Excelsior by (1) acting as an attorney in connection with the TNAFlix litigation
and the Mega Upload case, his concurrent representation of XVideos and/ or
XNXX during his employment by Excelsior and (2) spending significantly
excessive time on non-Excelsior/Liberty matters beyond contractually-permitted
time under his employment agreement with Excelsior and by failing to wind
down his non-Excelsior/Liberty legal activities, as also provided in Mr.
Randazza's employment agreement.

The extent of Mr. Randazza's contractual material breaches made
them also breaches of fiduciary duty--- regardless of whether or not those
breaches of fiduciary duty were conflicts of interests, as some were.
W. Disgorgement of compensation paid by E/L to Mr. Randazza is an
available remedy, which is appropriate in the circumstances of Mr. Randazza's
clear and serious violations of fiduciary duty owed to E/L, and within the
Arbitrator's discretion, based on the evidence in this arbitration.


There is no requirement that causation or "fact of damage'' be shown. There is
no valid reason to distinguish between an executive who is "in house" general
counsel and other corporate executives with respect to the availability of the
remedy of forfeiture/ disgorgement of compensation for breaches of fiduciary
duty.

While it might be less easy to determine the appropriate amount of
disgorgement --- because, for example, the compensation paid is not a fixed
percentage, as in an ali-or-nothing legal or brokerage contingency fee
arrangement, contractual hourly arrangements, etc.--- that is not a disqualifying
factor or consideration. Considerations of proportionality and non-overlap with
an award under other remedies are applicable.

Disgorgement will be applied to E/L-paid compensation received
by Mr. Randazza in connection with litigation and other engagements on behalf
of non-E/L clients--- in material breach of contract, while employed byE/Land
beyond the significantly limited scope of his employment agreement (in terms of
subject matter and time) and/ or, in all events, in violation of his professional and
fiduciary duties owed to his principal/ client/ employer, E/L. See Par. l(V),
above.

None of the expert witnesses who testified concerning breaches of
legal ethics and fiduciary duties by attorneys and remedies for such breaches
opined that disgorgement is unavailable in all instances. The Arbitrator had the
sense, however, that Mr. Joseph Garin came close to opining that causation
and/ or "fact of damage" caused by an assumed breach of an ethical/ fiduciary
duty is or should be a prerequisite to the imposition of disgorgement, with which
opinion the Arbitrator respectfully disagrees (if that is Mr. Garin's opinion).2o In
so opining, Mr. Garin (as did Mr. Randazza's California expert witness, Ms. Ellen
Peck) testified that --- based on information provided by Mr. Randazza ---there
was not a single instance of an ethical violation, with which the Arbitrator also
respectfully agrees, based on all of the evidence adduced at hearing.

X.   While Mr. Randazza's obtaining Mr. Gideon's signature on the
promissory note for Mr. Randazza's $25,000 loan to E/L for Hong Kong legal
fees was rife with ethical infirmities, in the exercise of the Arbitrator's discretion,
the Arbitrator will not void the underlying loan. However--- again in the
exercise of the Arbitrator's discretion--- the Arbitrator will limit the benefit of
that decision to allowing Mr. Randazza to assert an offset, under this paragraph,
to any and all amounts awarded on E/L's counterclaims, up to a maximum
amount of $25,000 (i.e., no interest)--- which right of offset shall be conditional
upon Claimant's transfer to Respondent Liberty of all Oron settlement-related
and other E/L funds held in Claimant's attorney trust account, plus interest at
the legal rate of ten percent (10%) per annum from August 29, 2012.
Y. E/L are the prevailing parties in this arbitration. As such one or
both of Respondents is or may be entitled to contractual attorneys fees under the
employment agreement.22



INTERIM ARBITRATION A WARD

Based upon careful consideration of the evidence, the applicable law, the
parties' written submissions, the Determinations hereinabove set forth, and good
cause appearing, the Interim Arbitration Award in this arbitration is as follows:

1. Claimant and Counter-Respondent Marc J. Randazza ("Claimant")
shall take nothing by any of his claims set forth in his Amended Arbitration
Demand.

2. Claimant shall pay Respondent(s) the following sums and
amounts, as and for monetary damages in connection with Respondents'
counterclaims. Said amounts are exclusive and non-duplicative of any amount
separately and additionally awarded to Respondents as part of the remedy of
disgorgement. See below.

Said amount includes the amount of $275,000, plus pre-award interest from August 13, 2012, at the legal rate of ten percent (10%) per and for monetary damages in connection with the resettlement of the Oron litigation, as a direct and proximate result of Claimant's violations of fiduciary duty in connection with his negotiating for a $75,000"bribe" (to conflict him out of future representation against Oron) as part of the resolution of the Oron litigation.

Said amount will include the amount of $60,000, by which amount
Claimant was unjustly enriched--- in that Claimant (via his law firm), rather
than either Respondent received (A) $60,000 in connection with Claimant's
ostensibly pro bono representation in connection with the Righthaven cases,
while compensated for Claimant's time spent on the representation as employee,
in the course of his employment, as to which representation the costs were
advanced by Claimant's employer, and (B) received from James Grady in
connection with the Oron litigation.

Said amount will include the amount of $3,215.98 ---as and for
Respondents' expenses reasonably incurred in connection with QUIVX forensic
examination and attempted restoration of data on employer-owned laptop
computers and an iPhone used and returned, as applicable, by Claimant and
Erika Dillon. In addition, an amount yet to be determined, in the exercise of the
Arbitrator of Excelsior laptop computers entrusted to Claimant and Erika Dillon during their
employment by Respondents or either of them. The additional amount awarded
will be set forth in a further and/ or amended interim arbitration award and/ or
in the final arbitration award.

3. Claimant shall pay Respondent Excelsior the amount of $197,000.00
--- as and for disgorgement of an appropriate amount of Claimant's employment
compensation (including salary and bonuses) paid under his employment
agreement).

Disgorgement shall be based on Claimant's violations of fiduciary
duty ---including as acting as an attorney in connection with the TNAFlix
litigation and the Mega Upload case.

XVideos and/ or XNXX during his employment by Excelsior and spending
excessive, undisclosed, time on non-Excelsior/Liberty matters far beyond
contractually-permitted time under his employment agreement.


4. Claimant is hereby ordered forthwith (i.e., within ten (10) days of
the date of the issuance of this Interim Arbitration Award) to turn over to
concurrent representation of Respondents all Oron-related funds and, further, an additional $30,000 of non-Oron-related client funds of Respondents--- which funds have been held in
Claimant's attorney trust account--- plus pre-award interest at the legal rate of
ten percent (10%) per annum from August 29, 2012.

5. An accounting of Claimant's attorney trust account is hereby ordered--- including to ensure compliance with Paragraph 4 hereof. The accounting shall be performed by a qualified third-party accountant and/ or accounting firm appointed and/ or approved by the Arbitrator.

The cost and expense of which shall be borne solely by Claimant--- although Respondents
may advance the funds necessary for the accounting, subject to ordered reimbursement by Claimant. Claimant is hereby ordered to cooperate fully with the ordered accounting.

6. Claimant is hereby ordered to return the as-yet-unreturned
company-owned laptop to Respondents' counsel forthwith--- and in no event
later than ten (10) days from the date of the issuance of this Interim Arbitration
Award.

7. Respondent shall be awarded as damages or costs reasonably
incurred with this litigation, expenses reasonably incurred by QVIX or similarly
qualified expert vendor--- up to a maximum of $3,500 ---in connection with the
vendor's performance of successful and/ or attempted retrieval of data a report to
the Arbitrator of what, if anything was deleted from the computer and when.

8. Respondents and Counterclaimants Excelsior Media Corp. and
Liberty Media Holdings, LLC shall be afforded the right in this arbitration to
establish their rights--- if any, and according to proof--- to contractual attorney's
fees and costs.

Counsel for the parties are ordered to immediately commence and
diligently conduct and conclude meet-and-confer communications and to submit
to the Arbitrator within ten (10) days of the issuance of this Interim Arbitration
Award an emailed proposed briefing and hearing schedule for any application
for contractual attorney's fees and costs.

9. Respondent Jason Gideon will be dismissed as a party to this arbitration.

Subject to further order and/ or a further and/ or amended interim
arbitration award, and the Final Arbitration Award, this Interim Arbitration
Award, including the Determinations hereinabove set forth, is intended to be in
full settlement of all claims, issues, allegations and contentions, on the merits,
submitted by any party against any adverse party in this arbitration. Subject to
the immediately preceding sentence, claims and requests for relief not expressly
granted in this Interim Arbitration Award are hereby denied.


Dated: June 3, 2015

Arbitrator

Stephen E. Haberfield

Source
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bzn2NurXrSkiMV9xcl9qeVdpSUU/view

Saturday, July 11, 2015

Liberty Media Holdings Wins Dispute Against Former Attorney Marc Randazza

Arbitrator cites Randazza’s “clear and serious breaches of ±duciary duty” in judgment against him (Full Interim Award can be viewed at http://www.LibertyVsRandazza.com)
Las Vegas, NV - A two and a half year arbitration dispute between Excelsior Media and Liberty Media Holdings - the parent company of the “Corbin Fisher” brand - and their former in-house general counsel, Marc Randazza, resulted in an award in favor of the companies and against Randazza on June 3, 2015, with the arbitrator determining Randazza had violated his fiduciary duties owed to them as their attorney and employee, committed numerous ethical violations, breached his employment contract, and caused them hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages over the course of his employment and on through the binding-arbitration proceedings.

The dispute between Randazza and his former employer and client began on August 13, 2012, when company executives discovered Randazza had attempted to secure for himself a $75,000 bribe from an opposing party in copyright infringement litigation.

According to the arbitration’s award, “… Mr. Randazza had been involved in and
successfully concluded negotiations for a bribe in the amount of $75,000, to be paid to Mr. Randazza by the other side in connection with resolution of high-importance litigation…”.

Randazza’s reaction to the discovery of his attempts to secure this bribe was to wipe his company-issued laptop of all data, refuse to hand over the company’s legal files, seize approximately $550,000 worth of the company monies being held in his client trust account, and resign his employment from the company.

Randazza followed up these acts with an arbitration demand, attempting to sue the companies for severance pay and millions in damages over what the arbitrator would ultimately determine were “… disputed, disproved, and unproved allegations…” of discriminatory conduct and sexual harassment against him.

Seeing through Randazza’s claims of discrimination and sexual harassment, the arbitrator - a former federal magistrate judge - ruled “… Mr. Randazza made highly-charged, sexually based ‘core allegations’… which were in the main disproved or not proved.

That failure of proof undermined and impaired Mr. Randazza’s credibility concerning all of his testimony and his claims related to his contentions.”

From the outset, the companies contended Randazza’s claims of discrimination and harassment were entirely fabricated, with Randazza’s goal being to overwhelm his former employer and clients with legal expenses and use the outrageous allegations to intimidate them into capitulation and a settlement.

The arbitrator would eventually agree, in full, with the companies, stating in the award, “The evidence established at hearing was that Mr. Randazza intended that his allegations would induce the company to authorize a settlement ±nancially favorable to Mr. Randazza.”

The arbitrator continued, “Mr. Randazza’s miscalculation… led to an ultimately successful counterattack by E/L, via counterclaims in this arbitration, centering on ethical and legal challenges to Mr. Randazza’s conduct as the company’s general counsel and litigation counsel during his employment by E/L.”

Once the arbitration was underway, the companies went on to discover numerous other instances of misconduct, ethically-prohibited actions, and violations of his employment agreement by Randazza, giving rise to the counterclaims brought against him.

The companies’ counterclaims against Randazza involved repeatedly engaging in attempts to secure bribes from multiple opposing parties in litigation, the illegal use of a hacker to access [prior adverse party] Oron’s computer data, engaging in a host of prohibited conflicts of interest (including representing Liberty’s competitors and tube sites violating Liberty’s copyrights), concealing his representation of adverse parties from the company, building up his personal legal practice in violation of his employment agreement, spoliation of evidence to cover up his ethical violations (including erasing data on company-owned laptops and seizing a company-owned iPhone), and taking
control of client funds in his trust account.

The arbitrator ruled in favor of the companies on all its counterclaims, determining Randazza had indeed engaged in these egregious acts and, in doing so, caused considerable harm to his former employer and client.

The companies’ expert witness in the case, the past Chairman of the Nevada State Bar Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, testi±ed in the arbitration that Randazza’s use of a hacker to illegally access Oron’s privileged e-mails with their attorneys and other con±dential information was one of Randazza’s most glaring ethical
violations.
The expert witness would also provide substantial testimony regarding the inappropriate, unethical, and prohibited attempts by Randazza to secure bribes for himself and his engagement in numerous con²icts of interest while representing and being employed by the company.

During the course of his full-time, salaried employment with the company from June 2009 through August 2012, Randazza took on numerous outside clients and built up his private practice, in violation of his employment agreement with the company.

In his ruling, the arbitrator determined Randazza’s work for outside clients was
“significantly beyond the contractually-permitted scope under his employment agreement”, further specifically pointing out such work was “undisclosed (and thus unconsented-to)” and many of these clients’ “interests were actually and
potentially adverse to E/L’s interests”.

The companies argued, and the arbitrator ruled, “The extent of Mr. Randazza’s
contractual material breaches made them also breaches of Fduciary duty”.
Included among these con±icts of interest, all of which the company argued and the arbitrator agreed Randazza had failed to disclose and had attempted to conceal, was Randazza’s representation of XVideos/XNXX, a tube site on which Liberty’s copyrighted material was regularly being discovered.

Ironically, while a full-time employee of the company in 2009, Randazza had spent signiFcant time researching XVideos/XNXX’s corporate structure and ownership as the company was considering Fling suit against them for copyright infringement.

Unbeknownst to his employer and client, Randazza would abandon any efforts at
representing them against XVideos/XNXX, and instead would become XVideos/XNXX’s attorney in exchange for a 5-Fgure retainer fee.

Over the course of nearly 3 years, when informed by his fellow coworkers of infringements of Liberty’s copyrights being discovered on XVideos/XNXX properties, Randazza would direct inquiries, claim the tube site(s) was insulated from litigation, and that Corbin Fisher material being discovered on the tube site(s) was even “fair use” - while not disclosing he’d taken the tube site(s) on as his own clients mere months after becoming a full-time employee.

During the arbitration, Randazza admitted that when company executives decided he should look at Fling suit against XVideos/XNXX for copyright infringement, he ended up disclosing their plans to XVideos/XNXX and tipping them off that a suit was being considered.

The arbitrator had considerable amounts of evidence upon which to base his findings, including material recovered by a forensic examiner hired by the company to retrieve data from the company-owned laptop Randazza wiped and the company-owned iPhone he was issued, tens of thousands of e-mails, text-message transcripts, and other documents discovered and presented through the course of the arbitration.

The arbitration proceedings also included video-taped and transcribed depositions, and 5 consecutive full days of in-person hearings.

The arbitrator would reference much of the evidence, as well as Randazza’s own questionable conduct during the arbitration, in his rulings against him.

Stating Randazza’s failure of proof of his allegations against the companies “undermined and impaired Mr. Randazza’s credibility concerning all of his testimony and his claims and related contentions”, the arbitrator went on to reference con±icting statements and testimony Randazza made in the arbitration, as well as in statements to a state bar in response to a complaint the companies had Fled against him, and in sworn statements to Nevada’s Equal Opportunity Employment Commission.

After the June 3, 2015 ruling by the arbitrator, at least one state bar has reopened an investigation in to Randazza’s conduct, with disciplinary action being a possible outcome.

Due to the nature and extent of Randazza’s breaches of Fduciary duty against his former employer and client, the arbitrator awarded considerable damages to the companies.

Ruling they were entitled to damages for spoliation and conversion (regarding the improper seizure by Randazza of client funds held in his attorney trust account and destruction of evidence on company-owned computers); the companies were entitled to recover damages “at least in the amount of $275,000” resulting from Randazza’s improper conduct during litigation against Oron (including Randazza’s attempts to solicit, arrange, and secure personal bribes from them and his use of a hacker against them without his client’s knowledge or authorization); Randazza was unjustly enriched by pursuing and acquiring monies for and to himself from multiple 3rd parties without his employer’s knowledge when he was supposed to be working on their behalf; the companies are entitled to disgorgement for the considerable amount of time Randazza was employed by them and receiving salary and bonuses, while actually performing work for other clients; the arbitrator also ruled Randazza had to promptly release all of the companies’ funds being improperly held in Randazza’s client trust account.

The arbitrator further ordered the prompt initiation of an audit of Randazza’s trust accounts, and the return of a company laptop Randazza continued to retain.

As of July 8th, 2015, Randazza had still failed to meet most all of the conditions of the arbitrator’s ruling.

The full Interim Award can be viewed at http://www.LibertyVsRandazza.com.

Inquiries may be directed to press@libertymediaholdings.com

Excelsior Media and Liberty Media Holdings are involved in the production, ownership, and distribution of adult content primarily under the “Corbin Fisher” brand. Marc Randazza was the salaried, in-house General Counsel for the companies from June 2009 to August 2012.

Source

Source
https://docs.google.com/document/d/1F-Z_0HgvfCkZETW4sPU9mdo7IRgLcgPXQhdrTAp0UOM/pub